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GATT MEMBERSHIP FOR CHINA: IMPLICATIONS FOR
UNITED STATES TRADE AND FOREIGN POLICY
MICHAEL A. BEZNEY*
1. INTRODUCTION
China, because of its rich cultural traditions and ancient heritage,
has historically viewed itself as a bastion of advanced civilization.' With
this perception, it saw little to gain from international trade involving
the embryonic nations of Europe.' This attitude was poignantly evi-
denced by the Emperor Ch'ien Lang's reply to a summons from King
George III, requesting the creation of a trade route between England
and China. The Emperor responded: "Our celestial Empire possesses
all things in prolific abundance and lacks no product within its borders.
Therefore there is no need to import the [wares] of outside barbari-
ans. 3 Within centuries, China was to be exploited by these "European
barbarians" under a series of forced treaties and trade arrangements.4
Later, China experienced the upheaval of revolution5 and a self-im-
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I See G. HSIAO, THE FOREIGN TRADE OF CHINA: POLICY LAW AND PRACTICE
1 (1977). See also Comment, Textile Import Quotas and United States-China Trade
Relations: The Dangers of Protectionism, 10 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 465, 467 (1984)
(recounting the Chinese history pertinent to an understanding of the PRC's reaction to
U.S. trade restrictions) [hereinafter Textile Import Quotas].
2 Trade itself, and the merchants involved, garnered little respect in ancient
China. Textile Import Quotas, supra note 1, at 467-68 ("[Floreign diplomats and dele-
gations were required to perform a complex set of rituals, including the presentation of
gifts and ritual prostration before the emperor, in order to gain access to the imperial
court. Only after this symbolic acknowledgement of China's cultural and material supe-
riority would foreign visitors be accorded the privileges of guests."); Hoffheimer, China
and the International Legal Order: An Historical Introduction, 11 CASE W. REs. J.
INT'L L. 251, 265 (1979); G. HSIAO, supra note 1, at 1.
' Theroux, China's Foreign Trade: Principles, Institutions, and Performance, in
POST-MAO CHINA AND U.S.-CHINA TRADE 55 (S. Leng ed. 1977).
" The English imposed these trade arrangements upon China after defeating the
Chinese in a series of military confrontations. Textile Import Quotas, supra note 1, at
469 (The Treaty of Nanking (1842) was the first of a series of treaties which "effec-
tively reduc[ed] China to a quasi-colonial State."). See also Treaty of Nanking, Aug.
29, 1842, Great Britain-China, 93 Parry's T.S. 466; J. FAIRBANK, THE UNITED
STATES AND CHINA 165-69 (4th ed. 1980).
' The communist revolution culminated in the founding of the People's Republic
of China on October 1, 1949. Li, Resumption of China's GATT Membership, 21 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 25, 26 n.13 (1987).
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posed isolation under Mao Zedong.'
With the ascension of Premier Deng Xiaoping, the People's Re-
public of China (PRO) launched its economic expansion.' It sought re-
newed ties to the capitalist West9 and an increased presence in interna-
tional trade.10 To this end, the PRO on July 10, 1986, submitted its
application for membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT)."1 The implications for the United States, resulting
from this application are the focus of this Comment.
Since China was an original GATT signatory, 2 the PRO is pres-
ently seeking to resume its membership status."3 It does so in an effort
0 During the cultural revolution (1966-76) Chairman Mao, stressing the need for
self-reliance, closed the door to foreign trade. Yiren, China's Open Policy and CITIC's
Role, 39 J. INT'L AFF. 57 (1986).
" Deng returned to power in 1977, one year after Mao's death. Deng consolidated
power by rehabilitating the 2.9 million victims of the cultural revolution and reinstating
his allies over Mao's chosen successors. Lee, The Implications of Reform for Ideology,
State and Society in China, 39 J. INT'L AFF. 77, 82 (1986). For an evaluation of
Deng's restructuring of the PRC's government and economy, see Clark, Rejuvenation,
Reorganization and the Dilemmas of Modernization in Post-Deng China, 39 J. INT'L
AFF. 119 (1986).
s Deng's Four Modernizations program embodied his plan for the economic re-
structuring of the Chinese system. See R. TUNG, U.S.-CMNA TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
ix-x (1982). The program refocused the priorities of the state from furthering class
struggle to reviving economic productivity and political stability. Clark, supra note 7, at
119-20.
1 R. TUNG, supra note 8, at ix n.50.
'0 The PRC wishes to normalize diplomatic relations and increase foreign trade
in order to acquire the technology and capital necessary for modernization. Id. See also
Xu, China's Economic Reform and Sino-U.S. Relations, 39 J. INT'L AFF. 27, 27
(1986) (stating that the PRC has "come to the conclusion that in order to bring about
maximum economic efficiency, [it] must combine state planning with market mecha-
nisms and open up to the outside world."); Interview: Paul D. Woifowitz; U.S China
Relations, 39 J. INT'L AFF. 33, 36 (1986) [hereinafter Interview: Paul D. Wolfowitz]
(stating that "China's decision to 'open to the West' and focus on its economic develop-
ment, as well as its less ideological stance on regional and global issues, is helping to
shape its prospective role as an important factor in the region's future peace and
stability").
"1 GATT Doc. L/6017 (in which the Permanent Representative of the People's
Republic of China informed the GATT Director General of the PRC's request for
GATT 'contracting party' status). See also Washington Post, July 1, 1986, at E3, col.
5 (in which the PRC declared its intention to apply to GATT, the organization regu-
lating global trade).
12 The GATT was signed on October 30, 1947, by 23 countries, including China.
Lansing & Rose, The Granting and Suspension of Most-Favored-Nation Status for
Nonmarket Economy States: Policy and Consequences, 25 HARV. INT'L L.J. 329, 335
(1984); GATT Doc. L/6017 ("[T]he Government of the People's Republic of China,
recalling the fact that China was one of the original contracting parties to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, has decided to seek the resumption of its status as a
contracting party to GATT.").
13 The PRC does not seek accession to GAIT under Article XXXIII as a new
member. Rather, it intends to resume the Contracting Party status it maintained as an
original GATT signatory. Li, supra note 5, at 25. Many academics and politicians
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to revitalize its domestic economy and expand trade relations with the
international business community.14 While the implications of accept-
ance for the PRC are extensive, they fall outside the scope of this dis-
cussion. 5 Rather, this Comment will focus on the ramifications of PRC
GATT membership for United States trade and foreign policy.
This Comment will first give a brief background on the GATT
and the PRC's involvement with that treaty.1 6 In order to gain perspec-
tive on the potential impact on the United States, the Comment will
then evaluate the present status of relations between the two countries
and the existing barriers to increased trade. Such an evaluation will
include a discussion of PRC trade regulations," U.S. statutes,:8 and the
United States-PRC Accord. 9 The direct consequences of the PRC's ac-
ceptance will then be explored. This will entail an explanation of the
potential for the PRC's Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) sta-
tus, 0 the impact on the existing United States-PRC Accord, 1 the im-
plications for U.S. trade regulations,22 and the policy considerations re-
sulting from PRC's membership in GATT.2' Finally, this Comment
will conclude that the potential benefits of the PRC's GATT status
outweigh any negative ramifications and, thus, facilitate U.S. accept-
ance of PRC accession.
24
refer to the PRC as "joining GATT" as opposed to "resuming GATT status." This
may either be a genuine misconception, or a political maneuver to challenge the PRC's
position in the application process. See id. See also Washington Post, supra note 11
("Technically, China will . . . be resuming its seat in GATT, because Nationalist
China helped establish the agreement in 1947.").
14 GATT Doc. L/6017 ("It is the firm belief of the Government of the People's
Republic of China that the ongoing process of economic reform will contribute to the
expansion of economic and trade relations with the contracting parties, and that the
participation of China as a contracting party in the work of the GATT will further the
objectives of the General Agreement"); Washington Post, supra note 11 (indicating
that China filed its application for GATT membership in order to maintain its "open
door economic policy" and increase export growth). For a general explanation of
China's objectives in joining GATT, see Li, supra note 5, at 29-31.
'" For a discussion of the political, economic, and social ramifications of GATT
membership for the PRC, see Herzstein, China and the GATT: Legal and Policy
Issues Raised by China's Participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, 18 LAW & Po'Y INT'L Bus. 371 (1986). For an explanation of the implica-
tions of PRC GATT status on the PRC, and on the GATT itself, by a trade official of
the Chinese government, who is also the Economic Affairs Officer of the UNCTAD
Secretariat, see Li, supra note 5.
11 See infra text accompanying notes 25-45.
17 See infra text accompanying notes 46-69.
'8 See infra text accompanying notes 70-87.
19 See infra text accompanying notes 88-106.
20 See infra text accompanying notes 111-156.
21 See infra text accompanying notes 157-184.
22 See infra text accompanying notes 185-195.
23 See infra text accompanying notes 196-204.
24 See infra Conclusion.
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1.1 Background on the GATT
The GATT is a post-World War II treaty designed to limit na-
tional barriers impeding international trade and market forces.25 Both
tariff and non-tariff barriers (i.e., import quotas, licensing require-
ments, and regulatory actions designed to limit imports) are covered by
GATT.2" Since its inception six rounds of tariff reductions, and a sev-
enth round of discussions aimed at reducing non-tariff barriers, have
been completed.2  As a result, new participants in the treaty must abide
by the decisions of all seven rounds by reducing tariff and non-tariff
barriers to levels comparable to those of existing GATT members.2
Presently, ninety-two countries are signatories to GATT,2" and
eighty percent of world trade is in compliance with GATT proce-
dures.30 Of those ninety-two countries, six are non-market economies
(NMEs).3 '
" The GATT is a trade agreement. It is not an organization. Its application and
enforcement was to be administered by the International Trade Organization (ITO),
formed in conjunction with GATT. While the United States accepted membership in
the GATT, Congress refused to ratify the ITO. As a result, the ITO failed to gain the
support of other GATT signatories, and the GATT became the sole vehicle for inter-
national trade regulation. Ehrenhaft, A U.S. View of the GATT, 14 INT'L Bus. L. 146-
47 (1986). See also Li, supra note 5, at 25-26 (failure of the ITO did not preclude the
application of GATT).
" J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 9 (1969) (stating that
those barriers that distort international competition and reduce trade between nations
are included within the scope of GATT regulation).
7 Rubin, Most-Favored-Nation Treatment and the Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions: A Quiet Revolution, 6 INT'L TRADE L.J. 221, 224 (1981). The location of the
seven rounds and their respective dates are as follow: 1) Geneva, Switzerland, 1947; 2)
Annecy, France, 1948; 3) Torquay, England, 1950; 4) Geneva, Switzerland ("Dillon
Round"), 1956; 5) Geneva, Switzerland ("Kennedy Round"), 1964-67; 7) Geneva,
Switzerland ("Tokyo Round"), 1973-79. Id. at 224 n.16. For a general discussion of
the first six rounds, see J. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL Eco-
NOMIC RELATIONS 473 (1977).
28 J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT, supra note 26, at 92;
Herzstein, supra note 15, at 374 (stating that a new GATT member must reduce its
own tariffs in direct proportion to the reductions of existing members since the first
round).
29 Kennedy, The Accession of the Soviet Union to GATT, 21 J WORLD TRADE L.
23, 25 (1987). As of April 1987, there were 92 GATT members. Id.
30 The general trend in international trade has been away from bilateral treaties
and towards the GATT multilateral trade agreement. Lansing & Rose, supra note 12,
at 335 n.30. See also Ustor, The MFN Customs Union Exception, 15 J. WORLD
TRADE L. 377 (1981).
" NMEs are countries with socialist governments. Their economies are not based
on free market principles, but rather on centralized governmental decision-making. The
state, not supply and demand, determines what goods should be imported and exported
and in what amount. The six NMEs presently in the GATT are Cuba, Czechoslova-
kia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia. Grzybowski, Socialist Countries in
GATT, 28 AM. J. CoMP. L. 539, 547. Cuba and Czechoslovakia were original GATT
signatories, prior to their conversion to communism. While both retained GATT status,
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It has been argued that the acceptance of these NMEs in the
GATT violates the treaty's basic assumptions. A NME relies on the
state to determine the level and type of foreign trade. 2 GATT, on the
other hand, is premised on the theory that trade between members is to
be determined by market supply and demand. 3 The treaty is intended
to reduce the artificial tariff and non-tariff barriers obstructing these
market forces." Since the state, not the forces of supply and demand,
controls imports and exports for the NME, GATT restrictions on tariff
and non-tariff barriers are inapplicable.
Despite this disparity, six NMEs have gained GATT status. This
is due largely to the NMEs relatively low export potentials and the fact
that their membership has been based on special restrictions which
their participation has become limited. The remaining four NMEs were admitted after
their conversion to communism. Accession to full GATT membership for these four
depended on the attainment of specified conditions that varied depending on the coun-
try. Id. For a general discussion of the difficulties raised by NME GATT membership
and of the various restrictions imposed upon Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Ruma-
nia and Yugoslavia, see M. KosTEcKi, EAST-WEST TRADE AND THE GATT SYSTEM
(1979). See also Patterson, Improving GATT Rules for Nonmarket Economies, 20 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 185 (1986) (discussing the alternative systems of regulations
through which NMEs may be integrated into the GATT without disrupting trade be-
tween GATT members); Liebman, GATT and Countertrade Requirements, 18 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 252 (1984) (concerning the impact of state trading on the GATT
system and the resulting countertrade requirements); Kennedy, supra note 29 (concern-
ing the differences between market and nonmarket economies, a history of the integra-
tion of NMEs into the GATT, and the potential for USSR membership). For a com-
parison of the four unique systems of limitations imposed on NMEs and the
inapplicability of these restrictions on China, see Li, supra note 5, at 34-39; Herzstein,
supra note 15, at 385-87 (concerning the same four systems of limitations and their
varying degrees of applicability to the PRC).
32 Kennedy, supra note 31, at 25-26. In NMEs, since international trade is con-
trolled by the state, the state determines what will be exported and at what cost. Import
and export determinations are not based on consumer demand or economic efficiency
factors but on governmental priorities. "[T]he NME government does not interfere
with the market process, but instead replaces it." Id.
11 Id. at 28 (stating that "GATT was and still is designed for countries in which
market mechanisms operate, that is, where trade occurs on the basis of purely economic
considerations"). The three basic assumptions of the GATT are: 1) imports and ex-
ports result from the activities of independent enterprises; 2) those enterprises are
driven by profit motives; and 3) the enterprises respond to the market forces of supply
and demand. Herzstein, supra note 15, at 374; M. KosTEcgi, supra note 31, at 35
("The General Agreement was created for market economies and essentially private-
enterprise economies. It was unlikely therefore, to provide an adequate framework to
deal with centralized economies and essentially state-enterprise economies.").
3' General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade preamble, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT preamble]. The members of
GATT seek to expand production, trade, and the full use of world resources "by enter-
ing into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory
treatment in international commerce." Id.
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compensate for their non-market economies.3 " The PRC, by contrast,
has a large population and vast resources that afford it tremendous ex-
port potential.3" Furthermore, the PRC has indicated its reluctance to
accept additional restrictions that have not been imposed on members
with market economies.3 7 Nevertheless, for reasons articulated later in
this Comment," the PRC's non-market economy should not impede its
accession to GATT.
1.2 Background on China
The Republic of China was one of the original twenty-three sig-
natories to GATT.3 9 As of October 1, 1949, mainland China became
the PRC. Taiwan consequently received both China's United Nations
seat and the Chinese membership in GATT." Taiwan occupied the
Chinese seat until March 6, 1950 at which time it notified the United
" Four approaches to NME GATT membership have been devised. Each is in-
tended to integrate the NME into the GATT community without disrupting the free
market balance of trade. See Grzymboski, supra note 31, at 547-49 (describing the four
general approaches and their impact on NME international trade). The four separate
relationship patterns between GATT members and GATT NMEs are as follow: 1)
Czechoslovakia, having gained GATT status prior to its conversion to communism, has
not been limited by further restrictions but is treated basically as a non-GATT mem-
ber; 2) Yugoslavia decentralized its economy and created a market system for foreign
trade. It thus attained GATT status under the same conditions as a free market nation;
3) Poland and Rumania did not change their economic systems but accepted import
commitments requiring each to import a certain percentage of goods from Western
GATT members (i.e., Poland agreed to increase GATT imports by 7% annually, while
Rumania tied its GATT imports to the average percentage growth of all imports); 4)
Hungary modified its tariff system and embarked on a limited economic decentraliza-
tion in return for GATT status. M. KOSTECKI, supra note 31, at 23-32; Herzstein,
supra note 15, at 385-90; Kennedy, supra note 29, at 28-33.
" "Although half a dozen socialist nations are GATT members, China's massive
trading capacity makes the problem of imbalance in market access a much greater one
in China's case." Herzstein, supra note 15, at 375-76. China's trading capacity results
from its abundant natural resources and a low-cost work force of over 450 million. Id.
" The PRC would be unwilling to gain GATT status and then be treated as a
non-GATT member, as is the case of Czechoslovakia. Likewise, the PRC refuses to
accept import commitments as did Poland and Rumania. Chung-Chou Li, a Chinese
trade official and economic affairs officer of the UNCTAD Secretariat, specifically
stated that "Itihe experience of Hungary, Poland and Rumania shows that an import
commitment is operationally unworkable and special safeguards [applied to NMEs by
GATT members] serve only to perpetuate discriminatory quantitative restrictions by
the major trading partners against imports from [the NMEs]." Li, supra note 5, at 34-
37 (describing PRC reactions towards the various systems of restrictions imposed on
NMEs in return for GATT status).
8 See infra text accompanying notes 100-06.
The 24 signatories included: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Cey-
lon, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Rhodesia, Syria, South Africa, Great
Britain, Northern Ireland, and the United States. GATT preamble, supra note 34.
40 Li, supra note 5, at 26.
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Nations (U.N.) Secretary General of its intention to withdraw from the
GATT. The PRC did not accept this withdrawal, and maintained that
the withdrawal neither bound the PRC nor invalidated the PRC's
claim to GATT status." Since that time, the PRC has applied for, and
received, GATT "observer status," allowing the PRC to attend official
GATT sessions, council meetings, and seminars.42
The impact of GATT status for the PRC would be extensive.
Since more than eighty-five percent of Chinese trade is presently con-
ducted with GATT nations via bilateral treaties,4 membership status
would allow the PRC to replace these agreements with a single com-
prehensive GATT treaty. This would not only integrate the PRC into
the international trading community but would also reinforce PRC
trade with GATT nations.4 In addition, GATT membership would
allow the PRC to take an active role in the regulation of international
trade and afford it greater access to foreign markets. Finally, GATT
status would facilitate the PRC's acquisition of the capital and technol-
ogy necessary for its modernization plans. 5
2. EXISTING RELATIONS AND BARRIERS TO INCREASED TRADE
In order to appreciate the full impact of the PRC's GATT status
on United States industry and labor, it is necessary first to understand
the existing trade relations between the two nations, including the per-
tinent statutes and policies through which the two nations regulate
their imports and exports. This framework will make possible an eval-
4' Id. ("The Chinese government has never recognized the validity of the with-
drawal, since the notification to the UN Secretary General came from persons not au-
thorized by the Chinese Government.").
42 GATT Doc. L/5712 (Oct. 26, 1984) (noting the PRC's request for GATT
observer status); Herzstein, supra note 15, at 373-74 (noting that GATT "observer
status" affords the PRC access to GATT meetings and seminars); China Attends
GATT Course, Wall St. J., Aug. 27, 1980, at 18, col. 3 (referring to a training course
given by the GATT for international trade specialists).
" Li, supra note 5, at 28.
44 GATT nations are less likely to violate multilateral GATT regulations than
they are to violate bilateral agreements. This is because a violation of the GATT treaty
may serve as precedent for a future violation of the same provision by a GATT mem-
ber, against the violating party. A violation of a bilateral treaty, on the other hand,
leaves the violator open to reciprocal violations from only one other nation. Herzstein,
supra note 15, at 380. For a current list of the PRC's bilateral trade agreements, see
CHINA INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC CONSULTANTS, INC., THE CHINA INVESTMENT
GUIDE 1986, 52-58 (1985).
"' The PRC currently views international trade as one of the most significant
methods of modernization. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, INT'L TRADE ADMIN., DOING
BUSINESS WITH CHINA 3 (1980) ("Chinese officials appear to have concluded that even
a scaled-down industrialization program cannot be successfully completed without an
infusion of foreign plants, equipment, and technology.").
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uation of the changes that PRC membership in the GATT will have
on U.S. trade and foreign policy.
2.1 PRC Trade Regulation
As a non-market economy, the PRC maintains four regulatory de-
vices through which it controls the level and type of foreign trade: 1)
Foreign Trade Corporations (FTCs);46 2) tariff duties;4 7 3) govern-
ment-regulated distribution of foreign exchange;4 and 4) non-tariff
barriers.49
2.1.1 Foreign Trade Corporations
Foreign Trade Corporations are corporations owned by the state.5"
While they conduct the business of the NME, their main purpose is to
further government objectives.5 These objectives often take precedence
over the goals of profit maximization and investment return. One of
their most prominent roles is the regulation of foreign trade.
In the PRC, each FTC maintains a monopoly over a specified
market in the economy. 2 It controls the manufacturing, distribution
"' See infra text accompanying notes 50-54.
7 See infra text accompanying notes 55-58.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 59-64.
4 See infra text accompanying notes 65-69.
50 FTCs are organized at the municipal, provincial, and national levels. Each
level is authorized to do business directly with foreign corporations but is subject to
review from the next higher level. R. TUNG, supra note 8, at 42 (describing the current
reforms underway in the PRC's FTC system). For a description of FTCs at different
levels in the PRO government structure and the potential for delegation of FTC re-
sponsibility to the cities and provinces, see DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA, supra note
45, at 21-22; Herbst, Selling Into the People's Republic of China: The Legal
Problems, 15 INT'L Bus. L. 303, 304 (1987) (discussing FTC monopolization by na-
tional FTCs of the import/export system and noting that while decentralization may
have ended the monopoly, FTCs retained their foreign trade role).
" FTCs are often used to regulate employment, maintain consumer prices, im-
prove the balance of payments with other nations, regulate exports and imports, and
promote the development of infant industries. Testimony before the Senate Finance
Committee, Aug. 6, 1986, at 2 (statement of Charles Owen Verrill) [hereinafter Verrill
on State Trading]. According to Verrill "[t]rading inconsistent with commercial consid-
erations" occurs when the goal of a corporation is the promotion of "state welfare
objectives," not profit maximization. While state enterprises are not per se inimical to
world commerce, using them to achieve official goals disrupts global trade. Id.
52 The creation of FTC monopolies makes it extremely difficult for U.S. industry
to compete with Chinese goods. JCCT Briefing Paper: Market Access 11-50 (prepared
for 1987 JCCT Seminar, Washington, D.C.) ("In most cases, only the Trading Com-
panies of the [PRC] Ministries, Provinces, and Municipalities are allowed to import
[foreign goods]. U.S. sellers-facing a monopsony (only one buyer) or a [sic] oligopsony
(few, large buyers) for a particular product-find it very difficult to obtain favorable
terms of trade."). For a discussion of the countertrade requirements instituted against
GATT members employing FTCs or state trading, see Liebman, supra note 31.
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and marketing of the products within that market. Since the govern-
ment grants FTCs special access to state financing, affords them hidden
subsidies, and does not require them to maximize profits, the FTCs are
able to export goods at well below market levels.5" FTCs are also the
state agents that determine the amount, type and national origin of im-
ported goods." FTCs are thus one instrument through which the Chi-
nese government regulates both the export of Chinese goods and the
importation of products from foreign nations.
2.1.2 Tariff Duties
The second major restrictive measure by which the PRC regulates
foreign trade is the implementation of tariff duties. The PRC maintains
a two-tiered tariff system. The first tier affords lower tariffs for those
countries with which the PRC retains a reciprocal treaty. The second
tier is reserved for "nonreciprocal" countries. 5 The tariff is paid by a
FTC on the goods it imports to the PRC's Custom Bureau, which in
turn transfers the money to the Ministry of Finance.56 The tariff is
effectively an intergovernmental transfer by one government agency to
"' FTCs engaged in commercial activities maintain the potential for serious trade
disruption. Due to their state control, they are able to export goods at prices that U.S.
companies are incapable of matching. Furthermore, U.S. exports are often unable to
compete with FTC products in the Chinese marketplace. For a discussion of the advan-
tages enabling FTCs to gain the competitive edge over U.S. industry see Verrill on
State Trading, supra note 51, at 4-6. See also R.J. MONSON & K.O. WALTERS, NA-
TIONALIZED COMPANIES: A THREAT To AMERICAN BUSINESS (1983) (describing the
advantages of state trading and the impotence of traditional trade remedies in control-
ling the resulting distortion of international trade).
" If a United States company intends to export to the PRC it must first contact
the appropriate FTC and government ministry (i.e., the FTC and the ministry regulat-
ing the specific type of commodity to be exported). DOING BUSINESS WITH CHINA,
supra note 45, at 5. For an exhaustive list of the PRC's FTCs and their respective
addresses, see id. at 36-40.
5' Those countries with which the PRC maintains a reciprocal trade treaty limit-
ing tariff duties enjoy minimum tariff rates on the goods they export to the PRC.
Those countries which do not maintain PRC trade treaties receive higher tariffs on
their products. It is unclear whether this difference in tariffs is ever passed on to the
consumer. China's MFN: What's in it for U.S. Exporters?, CHINA Bus. REv., July-
Aug. 1979, at 34 [hereinafter China's MFN]. See also After MFN: GSP, GATT and
IMF-Duty-Free Treatment for Chinese Goods?, CHINA Bus. REv., July-Aug. 1979, at
31-32. [hereinafter After MFN: GSP, GATT and IMF] (PRC refers to its tariff system
as having a "normal" rate and a "minimum" rate); JCCT Briefing Reports: Market
Access, supra note 52, at 11-48. According to this report, in addition to the two tariff
levels, a disguised tariff or an "adjustment tax" may be tacked on to imports. Further-
more, it is not uncommon for customs officials to demand more than the published
tariff rates.
56 The tariff duties are never really implemented against the foreign corporation.
Rather, the FTC transfers part of its foreign capital to the Customs Administration
Bureau which in turn sends it to the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry then reappor-
tions its tariff collections to the FTCs. China's MFN, supra note 55, at 34.
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another.
Although tariff rates result in a shift of government resources and
do not affect consumer demand, their level does have a substantial effect
on the amount and type of imports purchased by the PRC. Since each
FTC is awarded only a limited amount of foreign exchange with which
it may import foreign goods, it will usually choose to import the prod-
ucts of low tariff countries.5" In addition, the recent trend in the PRC
has been to base import decisions on commercial considerations rather
than political objectives, as was done in the past.5"
2.1.3 Government-Regulated Distribution of Foreign Exchange
The third, and perhaps most effective, form of trade regulation by
the PRC is the government's allocation of foreign exchange. In any
NME, the state's control of foreign currency determines the amount
and type of imports.59 This is because the government, not consumers,
decides where the nation's foreign currency will be spent. In the PRC,
FTCs are allocated foreign currency by the Ministry of Finance. 0
Thus, the Ministry of Finance determines which FTCs, each having a
monopoly over certain products, will receive currency. The amount
awarded each FTC in turn determines the amount and type of products
imported.6
11 FTCs prefer to import goods from nations designated as "low tariff countries"
since they receive a greater proportion of imports to currency expended. It is in the
FTCs' interest to allocate foreign currency efficiently and thus avoid the transfer of
purchasing power to the Ministry of Finance. Id. Furthermore, the difference between
the "preferential" rate and the "regular" rate is significant. For most products, the
"regular" duty may be as much as 10 to 30% higher then the "preferential" rate. JCCT
Briefing Paper: Market Access, supra note 52, at 11-48. But see China's MFN, supra
note 55, at 34-35. The report observes that many Americans and Europeans doubt that
tariffs play a large role in determining the PRC's import level. The paper gives three
reasons: 1) the difference between the normal and minimum tariff rates are not very
large (between 15 and 67%); 2) the government, not the consumers, pays the tariff duty
(except for luxury consumer goods); and 3) many goods the state wishes to import, e.g.,
technologically-advanced machinery or foreign equipment, are exempted from tariff du-
ties altogether. For a list of the minimum and normal tariff duties imposed on foreign
goods, see Import and Export Customs Duties, HANDBOOK OF TRADE WITH CHINA
(1973).
58 After MFN: GSP, GATT and IMF, supra note 55, at 32. For a detailed expla-
nation of the PRC's recent foreign trade reforms, see infra text accompanying notes
100-06.
" Grzybowski, supra note 31, at 551 (stating that in NMEs, licensing and for-
eign currency controls, not tariffs, are the favored mechanisms of the import control
system). The PRC's State Planning Commission uses resource allocation plans to con-
trol investment, purchase, production, and distribution decisions. See Herzstein, supra
note 15, at 374-75; Friedman, Enterprise Reform: The Three Li's, CHINA Bus. REV.,
Mar.-Apr. 1985, at 24, 26.
'0 See supra note 56.
61 JCCT Briefing Paper-Market Access, supra note 52, at 11-49 (amount of im-
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The situation is problematic because of the PRC's shortage of for-
eign currency. The Chinese themselves believe that "[t]he main obstacle
to the maintenance of the present momentum of China's trade expan-
sion is the shortage of foreign exchange." 2 In fact, the PRC presently
maintains a substantial trade deficit with the United States."3 Since the
government may only allocate to the FTCs the amount of foreign cur-
rency it currently possesses, its import potential is limited. 4 Thus, the
PRC's restriction of foreign trade is largely the result of its inability to
gain substantive access to foreign markets.
2.1.4 Non-tariff Barriers
Finally, the PRC employs a variety of mechanisms to regulate
trade, grouped as "non-tariff barriers" for the purposes of this Com-
ment. Such barriers include quotas, 5 licensing restrictions,6 specific
import restrictions,6 7 and market structure.68 Separately, each is a mi-
ports which a state organization is allowed to purchase is limited by "the foreign ex-
change allocated by the central government").
62 Li, supra note 5, at 31 (commenting that this shortage results from the protec-
tionist measures of western nations against PRC goods).
ES From 1971 to 1981 the United States maintained a substantial trade surplus
with the PRC. Testimony Before the ITC by Council President Christopher H. Phil-
lips, CHINA Bus. REv 30 (Sept.-Oct. 1982) [hereinafter Testimony Before the ITC]
cited in Sullivan, U.S. Trade Laws Hinder the Development of U.S.-PRC Trade, 22
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 135, 138 n.20 (1983). The granting of MFN status to the
PRC in 1980 did not remove the PRC's trade deficit. However, the deficit did fall from
$2.7 billion in 1980 to $1.7 billion in 1981, and then to $628.4 million in 1982. N.Y.
Times, Feb. 3, 1983, at Dl, col. 1. In 1985, China's overall trade deficit was over $14
billion. Washington Post, supra note 11, at E3, col. 5.
6' The Chinese firmly believe that "[gliven China's high import propensity and its
cautious borrowing policy, the expansion of trade will largely depend on its export
earnings. The high import propensity will have to be matched by commensurate access
to the world market." Li, supra note 5, at 30. This view is further echoed by U.S.
authorities. "If the PRC is to continue buying large quantities of American products,
there is a clear need for Chinese products to have fair access to the U.S. market to earn
the foreign exchange necessary to finance imports." Testimony Before the ITC, supra
note 63, at 30.
65 The PRC, unlike the United States, does not have a quota system per se.
Rather, the PRC utilizes a licensing system to restrict imports. See infra note 66.
6 Under the PRC licensing system, only organizations with the correct license
(usually FTCs) may import certain goods. The licensing system, while providing an
effective vehicle for PRC state regulation of trade, unfortunately serves to frustrate the
ability of U.S. industry to determine which Chinese buyers have the ability and desire
to import U.S. goods.JCCT Briefing Paper: Market Access, supra note 52, at 11-49-II-
50.
"7 Import restrictions are limits on the importation of a specific good. Due to the
PRC's severe foreign exchange deficit, the government often limits or altogether bans
the importation of products it deems unnecessary. These restrictions are often placed on
luxury goods. Id. See also China's MFN, supra note 55, at 35 (noting that consumer
goods imported from the West are prime targets for heavy taxation or special
restrictions).
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nor part of the PRC's import/export regulatory system. When com-
bined, however, they form a substantial barrier through which foreign
corporations must negotiate. Their relevance lies in the fact that GATT
provisions address their implementation by member nations.0 9
2.2 United States Regulations
The United States maintains two major forms of restrictions
through which it regulates trade. The first is a set of laws specifically
designed to restrict the importation either of a given product or of a
particular nation's goods. The second is the U.S. general system of
tariff barriers.
2.2.1 Import Restrictions
The first form of regulation includes a network of statutes that the
President or Congress may implement in order to directly reduce for-
eign trade. Due to the PRC's communist form of government and non-
market economy, its products are subject to three such laws.7 0 The stat-
utes involved include the anti-dumping law of the Trade Agreements
Act of 197971 and the anti-disruption laws found in sections 4067' and
" Market structure is a fourth restriction utilized by the PRC to regulate trade.
Foreign corporations seeking to sell in the PRC must often go through multiple layers
of bureaucracy to receive export rights. The state authorizes each agency and bureau to
reduce prices or limit contract rights. JCCT Briefing Paper: Market Access, supra note
52, at 11-50. Furthermore, a concession by a "lower" agency is almost always subject to
"higher authority" approval. The PRC bargaining position is enhanced because the
foreign corporation must traverse many layers of authority. See Doing Business with
China, supra note 45, at 10-11 (describing the various agencies, commissions, organi-
zations, and officials through which acceptance must be gained in order for a trade
contract to be authorized).
"See infra text accompanying notes 191-95.
I A communist form of government and a non-market economy are the two re-
quirements that trigger these regulations. The laws are intended to prevent a commu-
nist country from dumping state-produced goods, at less than competitive prices, in the
United States. Sullivan, supra note 63, at 135 (describing the three regulations, and the
benefits accruing from a redrafting of the laws). The Chinese view these restrictions in
a slightly different light. This is evidenced in Chung-Chou Li's statement that "Chi-
nese exports [to the United States] are subject to various kinds of discriminatory trade
measures such as discriminatory quantitative restrictions, selective safeguard measures,
and anti-dumping and countervailing measures applied on a basis of discriminatory
criteria." Li, supra note 5, at 30. It must be noted that this is not an exhaustive list of
the regulations through which the President or Congress may regulate PRC imports.
The three regulations discussed are the major statutes which currently pose some fric-
tion to U.S.-PRC trade relations. For a fourth important regulation, see Trade Act of
1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1975) (Responses to Certain Trade Practices of Foreign
Governments).
" See infra text accompanying notes 76-80.
72 See infra text accompanying notes 81-84.
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20173 of the Trade Act of 1974. Each law is intended to protect domes-
tic producers and may be applied solely or in conjunction with the
other two restrictions. While the three statutes were intended to supple-
ment the U.S. general tariff system, 4 their implementation may in fact
supercede the general tariff structure. 5
The principal trade statute regulating goods from the PRC is the
anti-dumping provision of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979." Under
this provision, the International Trade Commission (ITC) of the De-
partment of Commerce determines whether the products of an NME
are being exported at less than their fair market value.7 If the NME
export is priced below its fair market value, 7  and if a domestic indus-
try has been materially injured,7 9 an anti-dumping duty will be im-
posed in an amount that eliminates the favorable margin. 0
The second major trade law pertinent to PRC exports is section
406 of the Trade Act of 1974.81 Under this section, exports from com-
73 See infra text accompanying notes 85-87.
7' The United States' regulation of foreign trade through tariffs must be discussed
in the context of the United States-PRC Accord. The Accord determines the permissi-
ble tariff levels each nation may levy on the other's goods. See infra text accompanying
notes 88-96.
75 Tariff duties on Chinese goods are determined by the United States-PRC Ac-
cord. This treaty substantially reduces the level of tariffs imposed on imports from the
PRC. However, the increase in trade resulting from this reduction may be sacrificed by
implementation of the three statutes at issue. See Sullivan, supra note 63, at 173
("[Rlecent investigations of imports from the PRC under the antidumping law and
sections 201 and 406 of the 1974 Trade Act demonstrate how these laws, individually
or in combination, can eliminate the advantages of MFN status accorded PRC export-
ers under the Trade Agreement of 1979.").
7" 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1677 (1979).
" The fair market value of the product is determined according to 19 U.S.C. §
1677b (Supp. V 1981). Sullivan, supra note 63, at 135-36 n.3. Under § 1677b(c), there
are three methods for determining the fair market value of a product exported from an
NME: 1) the price at which the product is sold in the home market of a non-state-
controlled-economy country; 2) the price at which a non-state-controlled-economy coun-
try exports the good; or 3) the constructed value of such a good as determined by §
1677b(e). 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c). See also Testimony before the Senate Finance Commit-
tee (May 15, 1986)(statement of Charles Owen Verrill, Jr.).
78 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1) (1982).
79 19 U.S.C. § 1673(2) (1982). Only material injury or the threat of material
injury to an industry in the United States, or material retardation of the establishment
of industy, triggers this statute.
so 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (1982). The favorable margin equals the difference between
the fair market value of the gooa and the price of the NME export. See Sullivan, supra
note 63, at 135-36 n.3. Under sections 1673a(b)(1) & (2), a U.S. firm may petition the
Commerce Department to investigate an NME export which is being sold at less than
fair market value. The following are two examples of such investigations: Certain Ce-
ramic Kitchenware and Tableware from the People's Republic of China, 47 Fed. Reg.
24,231 (Int'l Trade Comm'n 1982); Canned Mushrooms from the Peoples Republic of
China, 47 Fed. Reg. 31,631 (Int'l Trade Comm'n 1982).
8 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1976). For a discussion of this section and its application to
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munist nations8 2 are subject to a "market disruption" test. 3 If the ITC
finds that an import from a communist country has caused a disruption
in the market of a domestically produced good, it may recommend that
a corrective duty or restriction be imposed. The application of these
additional restrictions is at the discretion of the President."
Finally, the third regulation applicable to the PRC is section 201
of the Trade Act of 1974."8 Under this section, the ITC reports to the
President if a foreign good is imported into the United States in such
increased quantities as to seriously injure a domestic industry. 8 If this
is the case, the ITC must advise the President of the possible remedies.
The options include: 1) an increase in tariff duties or import restric-
tions; or 2) a grant of assistance from the U.S. government to the do-
mestic industry."
2.2.2 United States Tariff Structure
The second major form of import regulation is the U.S. system of
tariffs. Imports from the PRO are governed by the United States-PRO
Accord. 8 This treaty limits the level of tariff duties that may be levied
on Chinese goods entering the United States. As previously discussed,
the accord allows U.S. exports to receive the PRO's minimum tariff
rate.89
The United States-PRC Accord awarded the PRC unconditional
foreign trade, see Comment, The Need for a United States Foreign Trade Policy, 7
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 113 (1985).
82 Communist nations are defined in § 2436(e)(1) as "any country dominated or
controlled by communism."
83 Market disruption is defined in § 2436(e)(2) ("Market disruption exists within
a domestic industry whenever imports of an article [competitive with the domestic good]
• . . are increasing rapidly, either absolutely or relatively, so as to be a significant
cause of material injury, or threat thereof, to such domestic industry.") (emphasis
added).
" The President, not the ITC, actually implements the additional restrictions.
However, his actions would be in response to an ITO report, which would define the
situation and identify the corrective measures necessary to rectify the disruption. See 19
U.S.C. § 2436(a)(3).
8' 4 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618 § 202, 88 Stat. 1978, 2014 (1975)
(codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251, 2252 (Supp. V. 1975)). For a legislative history of Pub.
L. 93-618 [19 U.S.C. § 2251], see 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7186.
86 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(2). The ITO may take several factors into consideration in
determining whether a serious injury has accrued. Relevant factors include: idling of
facilities, loss of profit, unemployment or underemployment, decline in sales, decreasing
profits or wages, or a loss in market share. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251 (b)(2)(A), (B) & (C).
87 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (d)(1)(A) & (B).
88 This Accord is found in the Agreement on Trade Relations Between the United
States of America and the People's Republic of China, July 7, 1979, United States-
China, 31 U.S.T. 4651, T.I.A.S. No.9630 [hereinafter Agreement on Trade Relations].
88 See supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
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most-favored-nation (MFN) status. 0 Since the PRC is a communist
country, this status must be renewed annually. 91 It requires that the
two countries:
extend all concessions or favors made by each in the past, or
which might be made in the future to . . . any other state in
such a way that their mutual trade will never be on a less
favorable basis than is enjoyed by that state whose commer-
cial relations with each is on the most favorable basis.
9 2
Thus, the United States-PRC Accord provides that the United States
and the PRO may not impose on each other's products tariffs that are
greater than the lowest tariff imposed on any other country with which
each nation trades.
It is important to note that there are two types of MFN status:
unconditional and conditional.9" With unconditional MFN status, if the
United States were to award more favorable tariff rates to France, for
" The United States presently maintains eleven unconditional MFN treaties with
non-GATT .members, including the PRC. Note, United States Bilateral Trade Ar-
rangements: Motivations and Legal Problems, 8 Hous. J. INT'L L. 279, 297 n.172
(1986) [hereinafter Bilateral Trade Arrangements]. The 11 nations are China (1946),
Ethiopia (1951), Honduras (1927), Iran (1955), Iraq (1938), Liberia (1938), Muscat
and Oman (1958), Paraguay (1959), Thailand (1966), and Vietnam (1961).
"t Because the PRO has a communist form of government, its MFN status de-
pends upon whether it meets certain requirements. The major stipulation is that the
PRC not restrict emigration. If the President finds the PRC responsible for preventing
emigration, the Jackson-Vanik Amendment (Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 section
402, Freedom of Emigration in East-West Trade, 19 U.S.C. § 2432) is activated and
MFN status must be revoked or denied. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2432 (a), (b) & (c) (1982). For a
detailed explanation of the amendment, its history, purpose, and application to commu-
nist countries, see Lansing & Rose, supra note 12 at 343-44. The application of the
amendment has primarily been used at the behest of Jewish groups lobbying for the
release of Jewish refuseniks in Eastern Bloc nations. It has met with some success in
Rumania, but not in the Soviet Union. The Amendment has not been applied to the
PRC, despite the fact that the PRC prohibits the right of emigration to its own people.
92 R. SNYDER, THE MOST FAVORED NATION CLAUSE 10 (1948). See also
Rubin, supra note 27, at 223 (observing that most-favored-nation treatment entails a
reciprocal obligation by each nation to accord the other nation those advantages the
signatory has granted to any other country).
" Prior to the eighteenth century, nations only extended unconditional MFN
treatment to treaty signatories. The United States was the first nation to grant condi-
tional MFN. In 1778, it granted France MFN status on the condition that France
reciprocate in kind. Treaty of Amity and Commerce, art. II, entered into force July 17,
1778, 8 Stat. 12, T.S. No. 83. Conditional MFN status continued to be the mode of
MFN used until the creation of the GATT, when unconditional MFN took its place.
See Rubin, supra note 27, at 222; Lansing & Rose, supra note 12, at 331-33 (describ-
ing the basic differences between conditional and unconditional MFN); Hufbauer, Erb,
& Starr, The GATT Codes and the Unconditional Most-Favored-Nation Principle, 12
L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 59, 59-60 (1980) (noting that immediately following World
War II the unconditional MFN principle became a "cornerstone" of world trade); J.
JACKSON, supra note 27, at 515.
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example, the PRC would automatically be entitled to the same terms.
Thus, the original treaty between the United States and the PRC
would be altered any time one of the two countries accorded a third
nation more favorable terms.9 With conditional MFN status, new con-
cessions would be given to the PRC only if the PRC would agree to
reciprocate in kind. The terms of the treaty would be static even if the
United States subsequently granted greater concessions to France.
9 5
The only way for the PRC to receive the more favorable "French
terms" would be to award to the United States concessions equal to
those accorded to France by the United States. The United States-PRC
Accord creates unconditional MFN status between the two nations.9
Thus, the ceiling on U.S. tariff duties levied on Chinese imports is the
lowest tariff rate imposed on any third nation with which the United
States maintains a trade treaty.
2.3 Impact of the United States-PRC Accord on United States-PRC
Trade
The ,primary difficulty with an MFN agreement between capital-
ist economies and nations with non-market economies is that tariffs do
not play the same role in regulating trade. Lower tariffs disproportion-
ately favor the NME nation. The reason is that in a market economy,
lower tariffs result in lower-priced imported goods. This translates into
heightened demand for the product and a corresponding increase in im-
ports. 8 By contrast, in an NME, the state levies, pays and collects the
tariff duty. Since the state purchases imports, tariffs play almost no role
in determining demand. Foreign trade is regulated by non-tariff barri-
ers and government preferences prevail over consumer choice. 9
While this scenario aptly describes the relationship between East-
ern European NMEs and market economies in the West, it cannot be
" M. KosTEcKi, supra note 31, at 35-36 (noting the unconditional MFN princi-
ple upon which the GATT is based).
Lansing & Rose, supra note 12, at 340.
Agreement on Trade Relations, supra note 88, Art.II; Bilateral Trade Ar-
rangements, supra note 90, at 297 n.172 (listing the United States' unconditional
MFN treaties).
Lansing & Rose, supra note 12, at 340 (describing the reasons NME states
receive disproportionate benefits from the exchange of MFN treatment with a market
economy nation). M. KOSTECKI, supra note 31, at 36 ("[Sltate-trading countries in the
GATT have profited from some tariff reductions, often without according any recipro-
cal concessions.").
08 M. KOSTECKI, supra note 12, at 41-58 (describing the role of tariffs in regulat-
ing trade under the GATT MFN clause).
" Herzstein, supra note 15, at 374-75 (Since China regulates trade through non-
tariff barriers, a reduction in tariffs does not increase the demand for that product.).
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extended to the U.S.-PRC relationship. Granted, when the PRC re-
ceived MFN status from the United States, the tariff rates imposed on
Chinese goods were lowered."' Correspondingly, demand for PRC
goods increased and imports from the PRC rose. 01 However, the Chi-
nese reciprocated by de-emphasizing tariffs as a regulatory device.10 2
This was accomplished through a massive decentralization of the
PRC's foreign trade structure. The monopoly of the state FTCs was
broken and authority over foreign trade was granted to over 1,100
manufacturing and service enterprises.10
Technically, the FTCs retained ultimate control over foreign
trade. In practice, however, their role became that of a foreign ex-
change commission facilitating the import and export transactions of
Chinese entities with U.S. corporations.0 4 In addition to increased au-
tonomy and self determination, many of the 1,100 PRC enterprises ac-
quired responsibility for their own profitability and efficiency.10 5 This
marriage of financial accountability and autonomous control in the en-
tities directly involved in foreign trade sensitized the system to market
forces. Once attuned to commercial considerations, the trading enter-
prises gained an appreciation for tariff rates.106 Subsequently, low tariff
0 For a detailed analysis of the change in tariff rates imposed on PRC goods,
after the United States-PRC Accord, see The Probable Economic Effect on Domestic
Industries of the Designation of the People's Republic of China as a Beneficiary Devel-
oping Country for the Purposes of the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences, Report
to the President on USITC Inv. No. 332-123, June 1981, United States International
Trade Commission, at 3-8 [hereinafter USITC Report on Economic Effects].
10 In 1980, the year the MFN accord became applicable, imports of Chinese
textiles, apparel, and footwear increased over one hundred percent from the previous
year. This is compared to an average annual increase of only 45% for the years 1976
through 1979. USITC Report on Economic Effects, supra note 100, at 3-8 (describing
the effect of MFN status for PRC goods on import levels, and the resulting impact on
domestic industry).
10' See Li, supra note 5, at 40 ("The Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations
and Trade has been progressively relinquishing direct management of the foreign trade
enterprises and moving towards indirect control through macroeconomic measures such
as exchange rates, customs tariffs and other fiscal and financial policies.") (emphasis
added).
10I Id. In addition to granting trade authority to foreign trade enterprises, the
FTC's have also relinquished some of their power over imports and exports to the
governments of various Chinese cities and provinces. See Doing Business With China,
supra note 45, at 4. Likewise, the monopoly of power vested in the Ministry of Foreign
Trade has been delegated to other ministries, further decentralizing decision-making
authority. R. TUNG, supra note 9, at 37-42.
104 Li, supra note 5, at 40.
105 Herzstein, supra note 15, at 393. See also generally Chao and Xiaoping, Pri-
vate Enterprise in China: The Developing Law of Collective Enterprises, 19 INr'i. L.
1215 (1985) (analyzing the evolution of production from a socialist to a more capitalis-
tic approach).
10' China's MFN, supra note 55, at 34 (impact of tariff rates increases in direct
proportion to the emphasis on market forces).
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U.S. goods received precedence over higher taxed foreign imports.
3. DIRECT CONSEQUENCES OF THE PRC's GATT STATUS FOR
THE UNITED STATES
The PRC's accession to GATT would have significant implica-
tions for United States economic and foreign policies. First, GATT sta-
tus would promote the PRC's request -for GSP status.10 7 PRC GSP
status, in turn, would alter the existing United States-PRC Accord."'
In addition, the present system of restrictions regulating trade between
the two countries would fall under GATT scrutiny. 0 9 Finally, several
United States foreign policy considerations would be implicated. 10 Al-
though varied, the consequences of PRC accession for the United States
militate in favor of GATT membership.
3.1 Generalized System of Preferences Status
One of the primary implications of the PRC's GATT status is its
impact on the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences. 11 The United
States awards GSP status to those nations the President designates as
"beneficiary developing countries." 1 2 Once a nation is accorded GSP
status, the nations' products may be exported to the United States with-
out the imposition of tariff duties.' This program is intended to pro-
mote the agricultural, industrial, and technological advancement of
third world nations. "  The underlying rationale is that once a country
107 See infra text accompanying notes 111-36.
108 See infra text accompanying notes 137-84.
109 See infra text accompanying notes 185-95.
110 See infra text accompanying notes 196-204.
11" The United States' Generalized System of Preferences is found in Title V of
the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 96-392, 93 Stat. 144, 19 U.S.C. § 2461 [hereinaf-
ter Trade Agreements Act of 1974].
11" Trade Agreements Act of 1974 § 2462(a)(1). The President maintains the au-
thority to designate a country as a beneficiary developing country. Section 2462(b) lists
those countries ineligible for GSP status. The PRO is not one of those listed.
113 Trade Agreements Act of 1974 § 2461. The President may award duty free
treatment provided that he takes into consideration: 1) the impact on that country's
economic development; 2) the extent to which other nations accord the country GSP
status; and 3) the implications for U.S. producers of like or competitive products.
11 See Hearings on H.R. 10710 before the Senate Finance Comm., 93d Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 1, at 322 (1974) (prepared statement of Ambassador William D. Eberle,
U.S. Special Representative for Trade Negotiations), cited in Note, The Generalized
System of Preferences: Nations More Favored than Most, 8 L. & PoL'Y INT'L Bus.
783, 785 n.18 (1976) [hereinafter Generalized System of Preferences]. The creation of
export industries in a third world nation,expands that nation's economic base and cre-
ates opportunities for growth in other sectors of the economy. This promotes economic
stability and furthers the advancement of the underdeveloped nation's standard of living
and technology. See id. at 785,
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develops a stable economy and begins to generate adequate foreign ex-
change, it will open its domestic market to foreign products. This in
turn expands the worldwide market for U.S. exports.11 5
Since the PRO is a communist country, it may only receive GSP
status under Title V of the Trade Agreements Act if: 1) its products
currently receive nondiscriminatory treatment; 2) it is a contracting
party to the GATT; 3) it is a member of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF); and 4) it is not dominated by international commu-
nism."1 ' Since China presently maintains MFN status and is a member
of the IMF, requirements (1) and (3) are satisfied. The fourth require-
ment is met because the phrase "dominated by international commu-
nism" has been interpreted to mean those nations dominated by the
Soviet Union,11 7 and China certainly does not fall into that category.
The single factor preventing the PRO from attaining GSP eligibility is
its lack of GATT status.
3.1.1 PRC Expectations and United States Safeguards
Should the PRC receive GATT membership, it would fully expect
to be accorded GSP status by the United States. This is evidenced by a
recent statement from a Chinese Trade Official that "[tihere should be
no serious difficulties for the contracting parties [to GATT] to accept
China's claim of developing country status [thereby entitling it to GSP
status] under relevant GATT provisions."116 This position is supported
115 Hearings on H.R 5897 Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm.
on Ways and Means 94th Cong., 1st. Sess. 83 (1975) (statement of Nathaniel Samuels,
member of the Comm'n on United States-Latin American Relations), cited in Genera-
lized System of Preferences, supra note 114, at 785 n.23.
6 Trade Agreements Act of 1974 § 2462(b)(1). See also Hackney & Shafer,
Protectionism and Developing Countries: The Impact on Trade and Debt, 23 STAN.
J. INrr'L L. 203, 207 (1987) (countries dominated by communism or members of
OPEC may not receive GSP status); Generalized System of Preferences, supra note
114, at 783-84 (noting that in addition to the four requirements mentioned, the Presi-
dent may take into consideration the level of the developing nation's economy and
amount of access it accords to United States' products); China Gains from GATT in
Doubt, J. COM. & COM., Sept. 2, 1981, at Al, col. 2 (major benefit of GATT status is
the fact that it fulfills the final requirement necessary for the PRC to receive GSP
eligibility).
117 The term "international communism" was incorporated into Article V to pre-
vent the granting of GSP benefits to Eastern European nations. It was part of the
United States' containment policy and was intended to isolate those countries controlled
by the U.S.S.R.. Since the PRO is both politically and economically independent from
the U.S.S.R., the rationale behind the clause does not apply to the PRO. Yugoslavia
and Rumania are also exempted from this term. THE STRUCTURE AND EVOLUTION OF
RECENT U.S. TRADE PoLicy 228 n.6 (R. Baldwin & A. Krueger eds. 1984).
118 Li, supra note 5, at 42 ("China is a low income developing country, with a
per capita GNP only marginally above that of the least developed countries, as estab-
lished by the criteria set forth by the United Nations, and many times lower than that
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by several factors. Most importantly, the United States has already
committed itself to PRC GSP status by stating in Article Two, para-
graph three, of the 1979 Trade Relations Treaty, that it recognizes the
PRC as a developing nation.119 In addition, the World Bank treats the
PRC as a developing country for loan and credit purposes, 20 and every
industrialized nation other than the United States currently affords
China GSP status. 2 While the President retains discretion over this
decision, refusing GSP eligibility once the four requirements have been
satisfied would severely strain U.S.-PRC relations.
In the event that the United States does grant GSP benefits to the
PRC, the safeguards and limitations within the GSP legislation ensure
that domestic industry will not be adversely affected. For example, if
any one GSP country exports greater than twenty five million dollars
worth of a given product or more than fifty percent of a specific U.S.
import, it must pay full tariff duties on all of its exports to the United
States. "'2 This penalty will be imposed not only on the goods exceeding
the $25 million or 50% mark, but on all exports. 2 Furthermore, im-
port sensitive or labor intensive articles such as textile, watches, foot-
wear, electronics, steel and glass are excluded from duty free treatment.
The President may also exclude any other imports, which he decides
fall within these categories.' 24 Even if the fifty percent or twenty five
million dollars export ceilings have not been breached, the President
may determine that a country has become competitive for a given arti-
cle and withdraw GSP benefits for that product.' 25 Finally, once a GSP
of the more advanced developing countries.").
119 Agreement on Trade Relations, supra note 88, art. II, para. 3 ("The Con-
tracting Parties note, and shall take into consideration in the handling of their bilateral
trade relations, that, at its current state of economic development, China is a developing
country.").
2 Li, supra note 5, at 42.
2 Id.; China Gains from GATT in Doubt, supra note 116, at A3, col. 1.
222 Trade Agreements Act of 1974 § 2464(c)(1)(A), (B). The $25 million figure is
adjusted annually in relation to the Gross National Product of the preceding year. The
50% value is calculated in terms of the total appraised import value of a given article
during the calendar year.
2I Hearings on H.R. 6767 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 15 at 1480 (1973) (statement of Charles R. Frank, Jr. of the
Brookings Institution), cited in Generalized System of Preferences, supra note 114, at
788 n.50 (explaining that "if a country exports $1.00 more than $25 million worth of a
particular article, the entire $25 million plus the $1.00 will be subject to [the] regular
[tariff] duty").
"22 Trade Agreements Act of 1974, § 2463(c)(1) (listing the "import-sensitive arti-
cles" and according the President discretion to create new "import-sensitive article"
categories). See also Generalized System of Preferences, supra note 114, at 784-87
(analyzing the rationale and mechanics of eligibility); Hackney & Shafer, supra note
116, at 207 (describing the requirements of GSP eligibility).
.2 This safeguard was enacted in the 1984 legislative renewal of GSP. See Trade
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country achieves a per capita GNP of $8,500 it loses its beneficiary
status and is subject to full tariff duties.12
In addition to these economic limitations on GSP benefits, certain
political restrictions exist as well. For example, a country which has
not reduced its trade barriers to U.S. exports, services, or investment is
subject to GSP revocation. 27 Furthermore, any country that fails to
respect worker rights or intellectual property patents may be excluded
from GSP benefits." 8 Therefore, if there is any indication that a U.S.
agricultural, manufacturing or service industry is being adversely af-
fected by a foreign nation's GSP eligibility, the President maintains a
variety of mechanisms with which to disqualify that nation. The PRC's
GSP status thus poses little threat to the traditional U.S. capital and
labor interests.
3.1.2 Benefits and Disadvantages of the U.S. GSP Program
While the potential for market distortion is limited by the safe-
guards incorporated within the GSP legislation, certain U.S. industrial
and labor groups have lobbied against the GSP program. Their main
argument is that GSP products are merely subsidized imports from
third world nations that displace "American-made" goods."' 9 These
groups believe that the result of the U.S. GSP policy is the transfer of
industrial facilities and the exportation of "American jobs" to third
world nations."'
What these groups fail to acknowledge is that the export sector is
and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 2948 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. (Supp. III 1985)).
12 Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, supra note 125 § 2464(0 (Supp. III 1985).
Once the $8,500 limit is exceeded, GSP benefits are phased out over a two-year period.Id.
127 Hackney & Shafer, supra note 116, at 208. These political limitations on GSP
"Beneficiary Developing Country Status" were created in the 1984 GSP Renewal leg-
islation. See Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, supra note 125.
11 Hackney & Schafer, supra note 116, at 208.
129 Hearings on H.R. 5897, supra note 115, at 109 (statement of Nathaniel Sam-
uels, member of the Comm'n on United States-Latin American Relations, reprinted in
The Generalized System of Preferences, supra note 114, at 790 n.60. The AFL-CIO
stated that affording GSP status to foreign nations and "encouraging more exports to
the U.S. at this critical period can only spell more lost jobs, more continued unemploy-
ment for milions [sic] of U.S. citizens and more adverse shocks to the already hard-hit
economy." Id.
120 Hearings on International Trade Negotiations Before the U.S. International
Trade Comm'n, vol. 1, at 118 (Augusta, Me., May 9, 1975) reprinted in The Genera-
lized System of Preferences, supra note 114, at 790 n.9 (The effect of GSP for a given
product is "to transfer production facilities from the USA, Western Europe and Japan
to the Beneficiary Developing Countries .... [There is not] a more efficient way to
export jobs from the USA.").
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the fastest growing manufacturing segment of the U.S. economy."' 1 It
accounts for four out of every five new jobs created. 3 2 Furthermore, as
William Cline has noted, "research has consistently shown that job
losses are usually attributable to slow growth in domestic markets and
rising labor productivity, and that trade in manufactures with develop-
ing countries has generated many more export jobs in industrial coun-
tries than it has cost in jobs lost to imports." '133 Granting GSP status to
a developing nation will only help it to generate foreign exchange with
which to purchase U.S. exports. GSP status will not contribute to the
loss of jobs in the manufacturing sector. If anything, it will help to
prevent the future erosion of this segment of the U.S. economy.
In addition, it is well established that service and high technology
enterprises are rapidly displacing the heavy industry and manufactur-
ing segments of the U.S. economy.' 3 In these areas the United States
maintains a competitive advantage over developing countries. 35 Be-
cause GSP nations do not have the foreign exchange necessary to mod-
ernize their economies, they are primarily shut out of the competition
for a share in the increasingly worldwide market of such high-technol-
ogy goods and services."3 " GSP status enables developing nations to
gain the foreign exchange with which to purchase these products from
the United States. It does not enable them to compete with the U.S.
service and high-tech industries in the domestic or world market.
"I' Brock, Trade and Debt: The Vital Linkage, 62 FOREIGN AFF. 1037, 1045
(1984).
1.2 131 Id. (It has been estimated that "each billion dollars in U.S. manufacturing
exports translates into 24,000 jobs.") Other reports have estimated the figure to be
closer to 25,000 jobs per S billion of exports. HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONS AND FINANCE 99TH CONG., IST SESS., DEALING WITH
DEBT, REKINDLING DEVELOPMENT: THE U.S. STAKE IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THE
WORLD'S DEVELOPMENT BANKS 32 (1985), cited in Hackney & Shafer, supra note
116, at 222 n.91.
113 W. CLINE, EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURERS FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
PERFORMANCE AND PROSPECTS FOR MARKET ACCESS, 121-22 (1984).
., Bilateral Trade Arrangements, supra note 90, at 284 (1986).
115 Trade between the Western nations and developing countries is usually a
transfer of technology and capital from the former, in return for raw materials and
labor intensive manufactured goods from the latter. The same holds true for the United
States and China. The PRC seeks the capital and technology necessary for moderniza-
tion, while the United States desires a new source of fossil fuels and new markets for its
products. See Sullivan, supra note 63, at 135. See also USITC Report on Economic
Effects, supra note 100, at 1-7 (indicating that future PRC exports to the United States
will consist primarily of labor-intensive products).
'" In order for the developing nations to compete in services and high technology,
they must first gain the foreign exchange with which to modernize their economies.
Presently, most developing nations still rely on the export of natural resources or man-
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3.1.3 Impact of PRC GSP Status on the United States
PRC GSP status will generate the same basic advantages and dis-
advantages for the United States as would GSP status for any other
developing nation. The only difference is that the implications of in-
cluding China, both positive and negative, are amplified. This is due
largely to the PRC's vast market, abundance of cheap labor137 and ex-
tensive reserves of natural resources."' These factors create tremendous
potential for high-volume, low-priced exports of goods and materials
from China to the United States." 9 Consequently, many industrial and
labor groups vehemently oppose the elimination of tariff duties on PRC
goods that would result from the designation the PRC as a GSP
beneficiary.' 4 °
Due to industry's concerns, the ITC published a report analyzing
the implications of PRC GSP status for domestic industry. In the re-
port, the ITC estimated that if the PRC had received GSP status in
1980, U.S. imports from the PRC would have increased by $272 mil-
lion, or twenty six percent. 14' However, even without the reduction in
tariff duties, trade between the two nations rose by 14.3% between
1980 and 1981.142 This minimal impact on United States-PRC trade,
as a result of PRC GSP status, has been projected by several market
analysts. 143
1"7 The total labor force of the PRC-450,000,000 workers-is greater than any
other nation's entire population, except for India. Engle, Reforming the Labor System,
CHINA Bus. REV. May-June 1984, at 16.
1"8 The PRC is the world's seventh largest producer of crude oil, ahead of all
countries in the Middle East other than Saudia Arabia and Iran, and is tenth in natu-
ral gas reserves. USITC Report on Economic Effects, supra note 100, at 4-17, 4-18.
139 Herzstein, supra note 15, at 376.
140 China Gains from GATT in Doubt, supra note 116 at Al, col. 1 (noting
AFL-CIO and various industry opposition to PRC GSP status); After MFN: GSP,
GATT and IMF, supra note 55, at 32 (noting opposition of organized labor in the
United States to GSP status for the PRO).
141 USITC Report on Economic Effects, supra note 100 at 3-4. According to the
report, textiles, apparel and footwear imports from the PRC were projected to increase
by $26 million or 6%. Minerals and metal imports were expected to increase $39 mil-
lion or 27%. Agricultural imports and chemicals were expected to increase $56 million
and $73 million, or 48% and 77%, respectively. General manufactured products would
increase $22 million or 29%. Forestry products and machinery/equipment would in-
crease $47 million and $5 million, or 93% and 90%, respectively. These figures are in
1980 dollars. Id.
143 Testimony Before the ITC, supra note 63.
143 See China Gains from GATT in Doubt, supra note 116, at Al, col. 2 (stating
that "[tihe ITC [determined] that GSP would not do much for China's U.S. sales");
After MFN: GSP, GATT and IMF, supra note 55, at 32 (stating that "[e]conomic
benefits [from GSP status] would be positive but minimal; one study estimated that
MFN would increase U.S. imports from China by 30 percent, while granting both
MFN and GSP would raise imports by only 34 percent").
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The reasons for this estimated moderate trade increase are varied.
First, it must be noted that many PRC exports to the United States are
currently duty-free or subject to extremely low tariff rates.1 Conse-
quently, a reduction in tariffs will not increase the volume of imports in
these goods. Second, a substantial portion of the PRC commodities
would not be eligible for GSP treatment even if the PRC did receive
beneficiary developing nation status . 5 This is because import-sensitive
or labor-intensive imports are exempted from duty-free treatment.146
Third, the GSP program has several limitations that are specifically
applicable to the PRC. Examples include the annual dollar limits on
GSP goods and the fifty percent ceiling on GSP benefits given to any
one beneficiary developing country." 7 Fourth, a large percentage of
U.S. imports from the PRC are products not currently produced in the
United States.1 48 Without the Chinese imports, U.S. consumers would
be unable to purchase these goods on the domestic market. Finally, a
substantial number of Chinese products already receive MFN treat-
ment. GSP benefits would not significantly reduce tariff dutids below
144 China Gains from GATT in Doubt, supra note 116, at A3, col. 2. Many PRC
exports enter the U.S. market duty-free, and each year U.S. tariffs continue to decline
as a result of GATT negotiations. Since the PRC's FTCs can vary prices at will, the
U.S. tariff rates have a limited impact on the volume of imports. Id. For example, four-
fifths of the imports of PRC agricultural products are duty free or are goods not pro-
duced in the United States. See USITC Report on Economic Effects, supra note 100, at
1-4. Three percent of forest product and printed materials enter the U.S. market duty
free. Id. at 2-4. Raw silk, which accounts for thirty eight percent of textile imports
from the PRC, enters duty-free. Id. at 3-7. Likewise, all Chinese artworks and anti-
ques are duty-free. See id. at 7-21.
H, The Commission's report on the impact of PRC GSP status for U.S. industry
and labor specifically notes the high percentage of PRC goods that are not eligible for
GSP benefits. It excludes those products from its analysis. USITC Report on Economic
Effects, supra note 100, Introduction. For example, only 6% of all textile and apparel
exports (a segment of the PRC's foreign trade responsible for a major proportion of its
export earnings, and equal to between twenty and twenty-five percent of its exported
products) would benefit from GSP status. Id. at 3-5,3-12.
148 For a description and analysis of the GSP safeguards and limitations responsi-
ble, see supra text accompanying notes 122-28.
147 For a description and analysis of the regulations and statutes responsible, see
supra text accompanying notes 118-28.
148 For example, all timber and printed materials from the PRC enter duty-free
or are commercially unavailable in the United States domestic market (e.g., bamboo,
rattan, and willow). USITC Report on Economic Effects, supra note 100, at 2-3, 2-4.
The same holds true for many agricultural products (e.g., high-quality hog bristles for
brushes, water chestnuts, bamboo shoots, and miscellaneous oriental food products). See
id. at 1-4. In addition, the PRC produces some goods which the United States is unable
to produce in sufficient quantities. For example, the United States' demand for petro-
leum products outstrips both current United States and PRC supplies. This U.S. de-
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existing MFN levels.14
While GSP status would not drastically increase the volume of
PRC exports to the United States, the resulting expansion in trade
would partially alleviate the PRC's shortage of foreign exchange. As
previously discussed, the main obstacle to increased trade between the
United States and the PRC is the PRC's lack of American dollars. 50
"If the PRC is to continue buying large quantities of American prod-
ucts, there is a clear need for Chinese products to have fair access to the
U.S. market to earn the foreign exchange necessary to finance im-
ports."'51 Since the PRC is reluctant to purchase exports from foreign
nations on credit, " ' it cannot import as many goods as it might other-
wise.'5 3 Furthermore, while the PRC maintains a cautious borrowing
policy,'" it has accrued some debt to foreign investors." 5 In order to
obtain the capital to make interest payments and reduce principle, the
PRC must either increase exports or decrease imports. 5 Increased
trade with the United States would facilitate the payment of U.S. inves-
tors, without reducing the importation of U.S. goods.
It is very likely that PRC GATT membership would result in the
designation of the PRC as a beneficiary developing country. This desig-
nation would enable the PRC to receive GSP benefits. The safeguards
and limitations embodied in the GSP program would prevent this des-
ignation from posing a threat to domestic industry and labor. In addi-
149 After MFN: GSP, GATT and IMF, supra note 55, at 32.
150 See supra text accompanying notes 62-64.
151 Testimony Before the ITC, supra note 63.
15 The PRO will only accept foreign credit to the extent that its national sover-
eignty is not threatened. The PRC has a history of relying too much on foreign credit,
and it is careful not to place itself in that position again. R. TUNG, supra note 50, at
14.
"' The potential PRO market for U.S. exports is nearly limitless. The PRO has
the largest population of any nation in the world. With over one billion people, the
PRO's domestic market is enormous. JCCT Briefing Paper - Market Access, supra
note 52, at 11-47, 11-48 (observing that the PRO's population is four times that of the
United States and seven times that of Japan).
154 Li, supra note 5, at 30 ("Given China's high import propensity and its cau-
tious borrowing policy, the expansion of trade will largely depend on its export earn-
ings."); R. TUNG, supra note 9, at 13-14. The Chinese have a tradition of financial
prudence and are unwilling to exhaust their full line of credit to finance expansion.
Thus, while they have ample lines of credit from the world bank and various western
countries, they have not taken advantage of their capital supply. Id.
15 R. TUNG, supra note 9, at 13-16 (describing the PRO's financial status and
priorities in capital expenditures).
"'For an analysis of the interrelationship between imports, exports, and interna-
tional debt, see Hackney & Shafer, supra note 116, at 222-24. According to the au-
thors, the overextension of U.S. banks to third world nations poses a serious threat to
the financial health of the world economy. Increasing the export capabilities of these
nations is one remedy that would rectify the situation.
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tion, any resulting increase in trade, however modest, would permit the
PRC to fulfill its unrealized demand for U.S. products without com-
promising its credit policy.
3.2 Impact on the Existing PRC-United States MFN Accord
The United States-PRC Accord is the second major area of United
States-Chinese relations affected by GATT membership for the PRC.
According to Article I of the GATT, if the PRC gains GATT status, it
will be required to accord MFN status to all other GATT members. 57
The PRC, in return, will receive GATT MFN treatment. The uncon-
ditional MFN clause reads:
any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by any
contracting party to any product originating in or destined
for any other country shall be accorded immediately and un-
conditionally to the like product originating in or destined
for the territories of all other contracting parties. " '
This clause is the cornerstone of the GATT treaty."' It is the essential
and binding principle incorporated within GATT to facilitate a free
worldwide trading system. 60
While the unconditional MFN principle is considered the major
benefit of GATT status, the PRC and the United States already enjoy
reciprocal MFN treatment. 61 Since Article I paragraph two of the
GATT states that previously established preferential agreements will
not be disturbed by the application of the GATT MFN clause, the
existing United States-PRC MFN Accord will not be preempted." 2
3.2.1 Impact on Mutual MFN Treatment
While both the GATT treaty and the United States-PRC Accord
grant unconditional MFN, accession to the GATT also qualifies the
157 GATT, art. 1.
158 Id.
159 M. KOSTECKI, supra, note 31, at 35 ("Non-discrimination is the central con-
cept of the General Agreement. It is first expressed in the famous most-favoured-nation
clause (article 1) . . . .")); Lansing and Rose, supra note 12, at 334-35.
"I M. KOSTECKI, supra note 31, at 35-36; Lansing and Rose, supra note 12, at
335-36 (Despite the creative restrictions nations have devised to obviate the uncondi-
tional MFN clause, in principle, it applies to all administrative rules, procedures, cus-
tom duties and tariffs used to regulate the flow of foreign trade.).
161 Agreement on Trade Relations, supra note 88, art. I.
162 GATT, supra note 34, at art. 1, para. 2. See also Bilateral Trade Arrange-
ments, supra note 90, at 295 (The significance of United States' bilateral treaties
granting unconditional MFN status is the fact that the treaties "in effect make tariff
rate concessions beyond the reach of GATT article I MFN treatment.").
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PRC for GSP benefits."' 3 These benefits are non-reciprocal.'" The
PRC will receive duty-free treatment on its exports, without a corre-
sponding obligation to reduce tariff duties for U.S. products. GSP
therefore, appears to destroy the reciprocity inherent in existing U.S.-
PRC trade relations.
However, as discussed, the present United States-PRC Accord em-
bodies the unconditional MFN principle." 5 This form of MFN accom-
modates non-reciprocity. Recall that under unconditional MFN, if the
United States granted more favorable trade concessions to France those
terms would automatically accrue to the PRC. 66 The transfer of bene-
fits resulted, regardless of whether the PRC reciprocated with compen-
satory terms. Thus, while GSP status would afford the PRC preferen-
tial treatment beyond that presently received by either nation under
MFN, this treatment would not violate the unconditional MFN
principle.
In addition, the benefits of GSP status are not 'substantially
greater than those received under MFN. As illustrated, the PRC will
not gain a substantive increase in exports to the United States as a
result of its designation as a beneficiary developing country.1 7 Further-
more, should the PRC receive GSP status, it will still be obligated to
accord U.S. exports MFN treatment."" Given that the difference be-
tween MFN and GSP benefits is minimal, the designation of the PRC
as a beneficiary nation will not substantially affect the existing MFN
Accord.
3.2.2 Variance Between GATT MFN Status and United States-PRC
Accord MFN Status
While the practical differences between the GATT MFN status
16. See supra text accompanying notes 111-17.
164 Id. GSP is essentially a 10 year waiver of Article I of the GATT. It provides
non-reciprocal, non-discriminatory preferences for developing countries. It is not a per-
manent status. After 10 years, the PRC would become ineligible for continued GSP
treatment and would revert back to its original unconditional MFN status. Hufbauer,
Erb & Starr, supra note 93. See also, Rubin, supra note 27, at 233 ("[Dleveloping
nations have always been largely exempted from the rule of reciprocity and that of
nondiscrimination. Part IV of the GATT reflects their special situation, as does general
acceptance of 'special and differentiated treatment.' ").
165 See supra text accompanying notes 93-96.
16 Id.
167 For the rationale behind the limited projected increase, see supra text accom-
panying notes 137-56.
16 The granting of GSP status will supplement, not preempt, the existing United
States-PRC Accord. While the PRC would receive additional tariff reductions, it would
still be required to maintain existing tariff levels for U.S. goods. See supra text accom-
panying notes 163-68.
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and the United States-PRC Accod's MFN status are not great, one
technical disparity may obstruct U.S. acceptance of PRC GATT mem-
bership. Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 premises the PRC's contin-
ued MFN status on annual reapproval by Congress."6 9 This approval
is conditioned upon the PRC's maintenance of free emigration poli-
cies. " The restriction is inconsistent with the GATT MFN principles
of Article I.m If the PRC achieves GATT status,the United States will
have to choose one of three alternatives to resolve the discrepancy. First,
it may request a stipulation in the PRC Protocol of Accession, allowing
the United States to deny MFN treatment upon PRC violation of emi-
gration rights.17 1 Second, as an existing GATT member, it may with-
hold GATT treatment from a newly-entering signatory under Article
XXXV.' Third, it may amend Title IV of the 1974 Trade Act to
exempt the PRC from the emigration and congressional reapproval re-
quirements.17 4 There are several reasons why the third alternative is
the most viable one.
The first alternative, that of requesting a stipulation in the PRC
Protocol of Accession, in effect incorporates Title IV of the U.S. Trade
Act into the Protocol of Accession. The inherent defects of this proposi-
tion are self-evident. First, the PRC is unlikely to appreciate U.S. at-
tempts to dictate the prerequisites of its accession.'" Second, the PRC
S60 Trade Act of 1974, Title IV, 19 U.S.C § 2432(b) (1982). ("The report [ana-
lyzing the beneficiary country's emigration policies] required by this subsection shall be
submitted [by the President to Congress] initially as provided herein and, with current
information, on or before each June 30 and December 31 thereafter so long as [MFN]
treatment is received . . ").
170 19 U.S.C. § 2432(a) (1982) ("[P]roducts from any nonmarket economy coun-
try shall not be eligible to receive nondiscriminatory treatment (most-favored-nation
treatment) . . . [if] such country - (1) denies its citizens the right or opportunity to
emigrate; (2) imposes more than a nominal tax on emigration...; or (3) imposes more
than a nominal tax, levy, fine [or] fee ... on any citizen [desiring to emigrate].").
17 GATT Article I is entirely unconditional. It does not permit requirements,
based on political considerations, to interfere with the free trade principle accorded all
GATT signatories. GATT, art. 1, para. 2. Furthermore, the Chinese are fully cogni-
zant of this inconsistency between the Trade Act's emigration restriction and the poli-
cies of GATT. See Li, supra note 13, at 32 ("[Tlhe United States, under its Trade Act
of 1974, grants MFN treatment to China on an ad hoc basis, pending approval annu-
ally by the U.S. Congress, which is inconsistent with both GATT Article I and Article
II of the bilateral agreement.") (emphasis in original).
172 Hersztein, supra note 15, at 383.
17 GATT, supra note 34, art. XXXV. This section was employed by the United
States to refuse GATT treatment to Hungary and Rumania, upon their accession to
the GATT. Herzstein, supra note 15, at 383; M. KOSTEcKI, supra note 31, at 30-31
(describing the implications of Rumanian and Hungarian accession for U.S. policy).
174 19 U.S.C § 2432 (c), (e). Section (c) allows the President to waive the applica-
bility of the emigration requirement for a foreign nation seeking or already receiving
MFN status. Section (e) lists those countries excluded from § 2432 altogether.
"I The PRC's national sovereignty has historically been a sensitive subject. After
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has historically opposed the imposition of politically-motivated "dis-
criminatory" restrictions on trade. 76 Third, and most important, this
type of regulation is exactly the form of trade barrier the GATT was
created to preempt. The GATT was intended to facilitate a worldwide
economic market, free of artificial barriers. 177 A restriction linking a
nation's domestic policy on emigration with the level of tariff duties
imposed on its exports is antithetical to the most basic tenants of the
GATT. Integration of Title IV of the United States Trade Act into the
PRC's Protocol of Accession is an inappropriate response to the
problem.
The second alternative is for the United States to refuse the PRC
GATT benefits once the PRC gains GATT membership. While Arti-
cle XXXV enables existing GATT signatories to refuse acknowledg-
ment of a new member's GATT status,17 8 it is not politically feasible.
The PRC is currently emphasizing its desire to reintegrate itself into
the world economy. It has made this objective the cornerstone of its
trade policy with foreign nations.17 For the United States to withhold
years of foreign domination and imposed treaties relegating the PRC to inferior status,
the PRC is concerned that foreign nations respect its self determination. See Textile
Import Quotas, supra note 1, at 465-71 (analyzing the PRC's international back-
ground, and the resulting PRC position on foreign trade in the 1980's). This trade
restriction, based on the PRC's domestic policies, is considered an insult to the PRC's
right of self-governance. It is highly unlikely that the PRC would approve its imple-
mentation into a GATT document, regardless of the potential economic benefits. Id. at
467 ("In recent years, China has maintained an unusually independent and self-reliant
posture in international commercial dealings and seemingly has placed national pride
and ideological purity above its own best economic interests . . ... "). See also Xu,
supra note 10, at 28 stating:
China is ready to develop relations with all countries on the basis of the
five principles of mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and territorial
integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's interna-
tional affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. We
will not let our relations with other countries hinge on the similarities or
differences of their social systems and ideologies.
176 For a discussion of U.S. restrictions deemed discriminatory by the PRC, see
Li, supra note 5, at 31-32.
177 Hufbauer, Erb, & Starr, supra note 93, at 60 ("By embracing the uncondi-
tional MFN concept in Article I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), the world's major trading nations hoped to replace the preferential trade
system of the 1930's with a flourishing system of multilateral trade.").
178 Article XXXV "provides that the General Agreement shall not apply between
any two Contracting Parties if they have not entered into tariff negotiations, or if either
of the parties does not consent to such application at the time either party becomes a
Contracting Party." Li, supra note 5, at 45 (arguing that article XXXV can not be
applied to the PRC since the PRC is not joining the GATT, but rather resuming its
old GATT membership).
171 "China's request for resumption of its GATT membership constitutes an ele-
ment of its open trade policy aimed at achieving a greater degree of integration in the
world economy." Li, supra note 5, at 29. See also Yiren, supra note 6 (stating that the
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acceptance of PRC GATT status, once the other signatory nations have
accepted the PRC's GATT membership, would be extremely detrimen-
tal to U.S.-PRC trade. Such a move has the potential to completely
sever U.S.-PRC economic and political relations.
The third alternative is for the United States to amend the Trade
Act to exclude the PRC from Title IV. Since Title IV was generally
intended to promote human rights in Eastern Block countries, in par-
ticular the right of eastern European Jews to emigrate to the West,"'0
it has never been invoked against the PRC.a1 Given the existing cli-
mate of U.S.-PRC cooperation, and the current course of the PRC's
economic and political reforms, it is also unlikely that Title IV will
ever be applied in this manner. The United States will not sacrifice its
gains in trade relations or threaten its anti-Soviet affiliation with the
PRC over the PRC's domestic emigration policies.
Even if Title IV might be applied to the PRC, the President
maintains the authority under Title IV to waive the emigration re-
quirement. In fact, the PRC has already been granted a waiver from
the emigration requirement, subject to annual congressional ap-
proval.18 2 President Reagan accorded this waiver to enable the PRC to
receive MFN benefits." 3 To facilitate PRC GATT status, Congress
must go one step further and remove the annual reapproval stipulation.
To do so, it need only add the PRC to the list of countries presently
excluded from Title IV.1L'
Given that the PRC's emigration policies are unlikely ever to af-
fect its MFN status, there is little rational basis for continuing to link
PRC seeks renewed economic ties with the international trading system to further its
own economic revival and modernization).
1.. See supra note 91.
181 The PRC claims that it allows free emigration to the West. For this reason, it
states that Title IV has no legal basis for application to it. Li, supra note 5, at 46. As
stated, the United States has not applied this restriction to the PRC for political rea-
sons. See supra text accompanying notes 169-84.
18. Under section (c), the President retains the right to waive the application of
the emigration requirements if (A) he has determined that such a waiver would further
the objectives of the requirement or (B) he has been assured by the country that it will
henceforth comply with the liberal emigration policies espoused by the Act. 19 U.S.C. §
2432(c) (1982). The PRC received this waiver, with the condition that Congress grant
annual reapproval. Li, supra note 5, at 46.
183 Three countries have been waived from Title IV restrictions: Rumania, Hun-
gary, and the PRC. See Waiver For Socialist Republic of Romania, Exec. Order No.
11,854, 40 Fed. Reg. 18,391 (1975); Waiver For Hungarian People's Republic, Exec.
Order No. 12,051, 43 Fed. Reg. 15,131 (1978); Waiver for People's Republic of
China, Exec. Order No. 12,167, 44 Fed. Reg. 61,167 (1979).
184 19 U.S.C. § 2432(e) (1982) ("This section shall not apply to any country the
products of which are eligible for the rates set forth in rate column numbered 1 of the
Tariff Schedules of the United States on January 3, 1975.").
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the two. The Congressional reapproval requirement is merely a proce-
dural formality. Unfortunately, it is a formality that has the potential
to disrupt U.S.-PRO relations. Title IV should thus be amended to
excise the PRO from this trade limitation.
The existing United States-PRC Accord would be implicated if
the PRC were to receive GATT membership. While both the Accord
and GATT afford unconditional MFN status, only GATT creates an
opportunity for the PRC to receive GSP benefits. These GSP benefits
will neither alter the existing unconditional MFN relationship nor sub-
stantively change the level of trade between the two nations. Further-
more, while Title IV of the Trade Act is at variance with GATT Arti-
cle I, this disparity is easily rectified through amendment of the Act.
Thus, PRO GATT membership would not significantly alter current
U.S.-PRO relations governed by the MFN Accord.
3.3 Implications for Existing United States and PRC Trade
Regulations
While the possible accession of the PRC to the GATT has the
potential to affect the United States-PRC Accord, it will not undermine
the application of existing United States trade regulations. PRC GATT
status does not preempt the application of sections 201 or 406 of the
Trade Act of 1974 to Chinese exports. GATT Article XIX allows a
contracting party to suspend or reduce any tariff concessions which al-
low a foreign product to be "imported. . .in such increased quantities
and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to do-
mestic producers ... [for] like or directly competitive products."1 5
The terminology of GATT Article XIX is compatible with the "mar-
ket disruption test" embodied in Section 406,8 and the "serious injury
test" incorporated into Section 201. s8 The United States may thus in-
185 GATT, art. XIX.
186 See supra text accompanying notes 81-84.
187 See supra text accompanying notes 85-87. Under section 201, three require-
ments must be met before the foreign import is restricted. The ITC must determine
that: 1) imports have increased; 2) a domestic industry has been injured or threatened
with serious injury; and 3) the foreign imports have caused the injury. 19 U.S.C. §
2251 (Supp. V 1975). If these factors exist the President may increase tariffs, tighten
quotas, renegotiate treaties or alter any combination of these restrictions. 19 U.S.C. §
2252 (Supp. V 1975). Should the PRO receive GATT status, the "escape clause" in
art. XIX will apply. In addition to the three prerequisites of section 202, section XIX
requires the United States to notify the exporting country prior to seeking restrictions.
GATT, art XIX, para. 2. Since the notification requirement could be waived, if the
delay resulted in further injury to the domestic industry, Art. XIX will not alter the
existing protection afforded under section 201.
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voke either of these sections without violating GATT principles."' 8
In addition, GATT Article VI states that an anti-dumping duty
may be "levied on any product of the territory of any contracting party
imported into the terriiory of any other contracting party [provided that
the duty is not] in excess of an amount equal to the margin of dumping
under which such product is being imported." 9 This Article autho-
rizes the United States to employ the anti-dumping regulations embod-
ied within the Trade Agreements Act of 1979.190 Thus, as a result of
GATT Articles VI and XIX, the accession of the PRO to the GATT
would have little impact on existing U.S. regulation of PRO exports.
On the other hand, PRO GATT membership would encourage
the PRO to reform its system of non-tariff barriers. The seventh round
of GATT discussions specifically dealt with non-tariff trade restric-
tions."1 This round created six GATT codes which limited the em-
ployment of non-tariff barriers by member nations. 2 Unlike general
188 See generally Li, supra note 5, at 45-46 (arguing that while section 201 is in
accordance with GATT principles, as illustrated by Art. XIX, section 406 is not). The
Chinese do not believe that section 406 should apply to PRC goods. This is because the
section is meant to regulate exports from communist nations, and the Chinese believe
that their economic reforms have brought PRC industry in line with market forces. If
this argument is in fact correct, then PRC exports are not at risk. Section 406 will not
be invoked unless PRO products deviate from market prices. Regardless of whether
section 406 should or should not apply to PRO goods, the section is not in violation of
GATT principles. GATT Article XIX provides for section 406 restrictions. See Herz-
stein, supra note 15, at 398 (proposing that oth& GATT signatories adopt regulations
similar to section 406, in the event of PRC accession).
'89 GATT, art. VI. The margin of dumping is defined as:
the amount by which the price of the product exported from one country
to another (a) is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of
trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting
country; or (b) in the absence of such domestic price, is less than either (i)
the highest comparable price for the like product for export to any third
country in the ordinary course of trade, or (ii) the cost of production of the
product in the country of origin plus a reasonable addition for selling cost
and profit.
190 Development in the Law, The Accession to GATT of the People's Republic of
China: New Challenges for the World Trade Regime, 23 WiLLAMETE L. Rxv. 843,
848 (1987).
191 See supra note 27.
192 Agreements Reached in the Tokyo Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions, H.R. Doc. No. 153, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 3-337 (1979) (The seventh round of
GATT discussions was concluded in Tokyo in 1979 and resulted in six agreements
covering: 1) Implementation of GATT Article VII (Customs Duties); 2) Government
Procurement Procedures; 3) Import Licensing Procedures; 4) Technical Barriers to
Trade; 5) Interpretation and Application of GATT Articles VI, XVI, and XXIII
(Subsidies and Countervailing measures); and 6) Implementation of GATT Article VI
(Anti-dumping Agreement)); Hufbauer, Erb, & Starr, supra note 93, at 61 ("The re-
cent Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations . . .continued the trend away
from unconditional MFN by enshrining the conditional MFN principle in the six
Codes addressed to nontariff barriers.").
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GATT provisions, which apply universally to all GATT members, the
codes pertain only to code signatories.' 93 Should the PRC choose not to
become a Code signatory, its exports would be subject to the non-tariff
barriers of other GATT nations. These barriers have the potential to
eliminate the benefits of GATT status.19 4 To prevent such discrimina-
tion to Chinese products, the PRC would have to become a Code signa-
tory and conform its own non-tariff trade constraints to GATT Code
standards. This in turn would benefit U.S. industry, whose exports to
the PRC have never been protected from non-tariff restrictions.1 5
PRC GATT status would thus limit the PRC's employment of
non-tariff import constraints, which are presently unregulated by ex-
isting U.S.-PRC trade agreements. This would create greater opportu-
nities for U.S. exports to gain access to the PRC market. However,
GATT membership would not preempt U.S. restriction of PRC ex-
ports through sections 406 and 201 of the 1974 Trade Act. Nor would
it prohibit the application of the anti-dumping law of the Trade Agree-
ments Act of 1979. Domestic industry would thus retain the protection
these regulations afford against the unrestricted importation of Chinese
products, and gain greater access to PRC markets.
3.4 Policy Considerations
The PRO's potential accession to the GATT creates extensive
ramifications for U.S. foreign policy. These policy implications un-
equivocally further U.S. economic and political interests.
The United States' designation of China as an MFN beneficiary
illustrated the extent to which trade concessions could be employed to
further PRC domestic reform.198 The extension of GATT membership
provides even greater potential for the transformation of the PRC's in-
ternal policies. "China seems to take GATT membership as a spur to
193 Bilateral Trade Arrangements, supra note 90, at 282 (stating that the codes,
in effect, create conditional relations between GATT members since the benefits extend
only to Code Signatories.); Ehrenhaft, supra note 25, at 147 ("Signatories to the Codes
agree to be bound by the provisions of the Codes which are, for the most part, more
specific rules detailing the implications of the general provisions in the GATT.").
19 The restriction of imports, through non-tariff barriers, can nullify the effect of
reductions in tariff duties. See supra notes 65-68.
None of the treaties concerning U.S.-PRC trade have ever broached the issue
of the PRC's non-tariff import restrictions. The reason for this is that, unlike tariff
duties, non-tariff barriers are considered part of a nation's internal domestic policy.
Many nations, specifically the PRO, consider their domestic policies to be sacrosanct.
Interference in internal regulations is considered a threat to self-determination. See gen-
erally Hufbauer, Erb, & Starr, supra, note 93, at 67 ("In order to deal with nontariff
distortions, each nation must accept limited international discipline over measures pre-
viously regarded as 'internal' economic policy tools.").
196 See supra text accompanying notes 100-06.
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accelerate its domestic economic reform, and the outcome of the future
negotiations on its membership could have important implications on
the continuity of an outward-looking strategy."'"" This is evidenced by
the PRC's economic and political reorganization, which has sensitized
the PRC to market forces and brought it in line with GATT assump-
tions and procedures. "The change of developmental strategy underlies
a fundamental shift of economic thinking, involving a more favorable
attitude towards the international division of labors, and shifting em-
phasis [away from] self-sufficient internal growth towards a more out-
ward-looking approach." ' GATT status thus promotes the movement
of the PRC towards domestic reforms and extends its integration into
the world economy. This facilitates trade between the PRC and the
capitalist West, and opens the vast PRC market to U.S. goods.
In addition, PRC GATT membership would have a substantial
impact on the GATT and the fundamental concept of free trade to
which the treaty subscribes. The United States has benefitted exten-
sively from both the GATT treaty and the free trade principle. In
1933, when protectionism was at its peak, U.S. exports were subject to
an average tariff of fifty-four percent.199 In 1984, after seven GATT
rounds, the average tariff imposed on United States goods had plum-
meted to less than ten percent.200 The GATT decreased trade barriers
and created a worldwide market for U.S. products.
Unfortunately, the GATT treaty is presently facing the possibility
of obsolescence. The increasing deployment of "regional and bilateral
trade agreements [has the potential to] ultimately render the GATT
and multilateralism meaningless."' 0 ' Arthur Dunkel, Director General
of GATT, has stated that GATT members no longer appear willing to
devote the effort and to make the necessary sacrifices required to main-
tain the progress in multilateralism sustained by GATT since its incep-
197 Li, supra note 5, at 38. Li argues that "[i]ncreasing aggregate market access to
China could be secured by facilitating the Chinese economic reform towards a more
market-oriented economy; this could best be done by allowing China to resume its full
Contracting Party Status." Id. at 33.
199 Id., at 29-30.
199 Textile Import Quotas, supra note 1, at 477-78.
200 Id.
20 Bilateral Trade Arrangements, supra note 90, at 303 (concluding that "[o]ne
can only hope that bilateral efforts will renew commitment to multilateralism before
world trade begins to resemble the patchwork of exclusionary trade-blocks that the
GATT was intended to prevent"). For an analysis of the impact of multilateral and
bilateral treaties concluded outside GATT parameters, and the resulting impact on the
GATT, see Rubin, supra note 22. Dissatisfaction with the treaty has arisen not only as
a result of GATT's inadequate coverage of trade restraints, but also from the wide-
spread refusal of members to abide by GATT principles. Id. at 224.
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tion.202 Should the PRC gain GATT membership, the numerous bilat-
eral treaties presently in force between the PRC and GATT nations
would be replaced by the single multilateral GATT document. In addi-
tion, a very large and economically-powerful country would be brought
within GATT regulation. Insofar as this would strengthen GATT and
further multilateralism, PRC membership benefits the United States.
Finally, PRC GATT status has the potential to stabilize world
relations. A politically and economically-strong and independent PRC
could provide ballast between the existing superpowers.20 3 The PRC
also provides an alternative to Soviet style communism, an alternative
which illustrates the capability of communist nations to become fully
integrated in the world market. To the extent that PRC GATT status
increases international trade and decreases tariff and non-tariff barri-
ers, the political and economic stability of the international community
is enhanced. "Economic development and world prosperity are the best
guarantees of peace; trade, one of the most important factors in raising
the standard of living, responds to a political climate which promotes
[a] sense of security. ' ' 20 4 The PRC's membership in the GATT pro-
motes both world political stability and international economic growth.
The advancement of these inseparable factors furthers U.S. interests,
and militates in favor of PRC accession.
4. CONCLUSION
The PRC's application for GATT membership has aroused con-
siderable discussion within the U.S. foreign trade community. Much of
the reaction has been negative. This Comment is intended to illustrate
the favorable consequences of PRC GATT status.
The trade relations between the United States and the PRC are
predominantly governed by the United States-PRO Accord. This treaty
202 GATT's Dunkel Sees Danger to World Economy in Bilateralism, Sectorism,
Int'l Trade Rep., Mar. 10, 1982, at 556.
1*1 Interview: Paul D.Wolfowitz, supra note 10, at 33. The threat to world peace
and security posed by the Soviet Union initially instigated U.S.-PRC relations. Both
nations viewed the Soviet Union with distrust. The mutual interest in Soviet contain-
ment thus facilitated increased military and economic trade. It also helped the United
States and the PRO to gloss over their concerns for each other's form of government.
Id.
204 Grzybowski, supra note 31, at 553 (arguing for increased integration of social-
ist economies into the GATT). See also J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW
OF GATT, 329-32 (1969) (opining that international trade is furthered far more by
universal participation in economic discussions, than by the exclusion of socialist coun-
tries.); Generalized System of Preferences, supra note 114 (positing that the current
hostility much of the underdeveloped world holds for the West could be ameliorated by
replacing the existing program of foreign aid with a system of trade preferences).
1989]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
prompted the decentralization of the PRC's FTCs and the delegation of
trade authority to autonomous profit-maximizing entities. Should the
PRC gain GATT membership, this status would provide further impe-
tus for such reforms. GATT would facilitate the integration of the
PRC into the international trading system, and attune the PRC econ-
omy to market forces. To the extent that this would decrease PRC
tariff and non-tariff barriers and bring Chinese trade under GATT
principles, U.S. interests are furthered.
While PRC GATT membership would also qualify the PRC for
GSP treatment, it would not undermine the existing unconditional
MFN benefits accorded each nation. United States industry and labor
would still be protected by the limitations and safeguards inherent in
the GSP system. The modest gains in trade received by the PRO as a
result of GSP status would not be so substantial as to injure U.S. do-
mestic industry. These gains would, on the other hand, allow the PRC
to partially ameliorate its trade deficit, and raise the foreign currency
necessary for its current modernization plans. Much of this currency
would be spent on U.S. exports of high-technology, and the repayment
of loans from U.S. investors.
The PRC's accession would not limit the ability of the United
States to regulate PRC trade through present legislative restrictions.
The employment of sections 406 and 201 of the 1974 Trade Act and
the anti-dumping law of the Trade Agreements Act of 1979, would not
be restricted. GATT Articles XIX and VI authorize the utilization of
these restrictions within the GATT framework. While PRC GATT
status would preclude the imposition of an emigration requirement on
China under Title IV of the 1974 Trade Act, the elimination of this
requirement would not affect the United States' existing foreign policy.
Title IV has never been applied to the PRC, and the negative ramifica-
tions of applying Title IV precludes its application in the foreseeable
future.
The PRC's accession, therefore, would facilitate the economic and
political transformation of Chinese society. It would also open the vast
Chinese market to U.S. goods and services, without limiting the United
States' ability to regulate PRC imports. Given the importance of con-
tinued favorable relations between the two nations, the United States
should promote PRC GATT status.
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